Abstract Mix network plays a key role in electronic voting to preserve anonymity and lots of mixnet schemes have been proposed so far. However, they requires complex and costly zero-knowledge proofs to provide their correct mixing operations. In 2010, Sebé et al. proposed an efficient and lightweight mixnet scheme based on a cryptographic secure hash function instead of zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper, we present a more efficient and faster mixnet scheme than Sebé et al.'s scheme under the same assumption. Also, our scheme is secure.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Mixes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem, as published by D.Chaum in 1981 [1] . A mix-network or mixnet accepts as input a collection of ciphertexts, and outputs associated plaintexts(or ciphertexts) in a randomly permuted order. A well constructed mixnet makes it infeasible for an adversary to determine which plaintext output corresponds to which ciphertext input more efficiently than by guessing at random. Proposed by D.Chaum in 1981 as a technique for anonymous e-mail and e-voting, mixnet can be categorized into decryption mix-nets and re-encryption mix-nets [2, 3] . A mixnet consists of a sequence of servers, mixes. Each server receives a batch of input messages and produces as output the batch in permuted(mixed) order [1, 4, 5] . In e-voting, after [1] , lots of e-voting schemes based on mixnet have been proposed so far, and they are called Mix-type voting schemes [4, 6, 7] . Mix networks are often called mix cascades or shuffle networks. In e-voting, encrypted votes are inputted to the mix network as an input batch. An observer should not be able to match the outputs with corresponding inputs; this property provides anonymity(voter privacy) in an e-voting. To provide this property, each mix server should also output a proof that it has operated correctly. Otherwise, a dishonest server could replace a ballot with another one or simply do not shuffle at all without anybody noticing.
In [6] , they stated that a robust mix network should:
•operate correctly: the output should correspond to a permutation of the input,
•provide privacy: an observer should not be able to determine which input element corresponds to a given output element(and vice versa) in any way better than guessing, and
•be robust: provide a proof or at least strong evidence that it has operated correctly. In addition, it is beneficial if any interested party is able to check the proof or evaluate the evidence; a property called publicverifiability.
Though a mix-net is based on a public cryptosystem, for e.g., ElGamal cryptosystem, direct implementation using RSA without composition with other functions(for e.g., destroying the multiplicative structure), can be broken by an active attack which is perfectly feasible in a typical mix-environment [8, 9] .
The mixing of encrypted votes should be done verifiably, i.e., there must exist some method to prove that no manupulation, such as vote replacement has taken place during this procedure. This verification method has to accomplish two main properties:
•A dishonest mixer will be caught with high probability even if a single plaintext message gets modified.
•It does not break unlinkability. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
Ⅱ. Related works 1. Elgamal cryptosystem
The ElGamal cryptosystem is based on discrete logarithms. Let  be a large prime and  be a generator of    both public parameters and  must be chosen such that    has at least one large prime factor , i.e.   . Suppose  wants to send a message to  , then  selects its private key  and computes     , and then publishes . 
.
ElGamal cryptosystem has two important properties, homomorphic and remasking(reencryption) properties.
Homomorphic property means that decryption of production of two ciphertexts produces production of two plaintexts, i.e., multiplicative homomorphic property [10, 11] . the tuple  sent by the prover to the verifier.
Sebe et al.' s mixnet
In this section, we briefly review Sebé et al.'s mixing scheme.
(
1) Notations
The notations used in this paper are as follows:
•  : trusted party.
• :  's private key.
• :  's public key (    ).
• : the number of mix servers.
•   : the i th mix server ( ≤  ≤ ).
•  : the number of encrypted votes.
•   : the j th voter.
•   : the j th encrypted vote.
        ≤  ≤ 
• •: a cryptographic secure hash function.
• : a permutation function. After this is done, all participants check:
• The correctness of  
• Check_whether           ′ holds or not.
• Check whether   ′    ′  holds or not using
If these checks are satisfied,  decrypts   ′       ′  and publishes its plaintext   ′ with the corresponding proof of correct decryption. 
Ⅲ. Improved mixing scheme
In this section, we present an improved mixnet scheme.
Vote mixing
At first, The  computes and publishes 
Security and efficiency
As long as at least one mix server is honest, then the overall permutation will not be known and the probability of not detecting that a honest mix server has been bypassed is    because the honest server selects one ciphertext randomly among  ciphertexts. 
Ⅳ. Conclusion
In this paper, an efficient and simple mixnet scheme has been proposed. It requires fewer hash operations and no comparison operations at all, and thus is more efficient than Sebé et al.'s mixnet scheme under the same assumptions.
